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ABSTRACT
Barter in Russia can be explained by firms liquidity constraint: it is strongly correlated with financial
tightness. However a micro-economic analysis reveals that the rationale behind this liquidity
constraint is different according to the firm situation. For firms in a good economic situation, but
faced with adverse selection problem and having no access to bank credit, barter acts as a substitute
for short term credit. While for indebted firms, barter, in the same way as external finance, is a way of
avoiding costly restructuring.
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I INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of barter is one of the most surprising phenomena in Russia: As a percentage of
industrial sales it steadily increased from 5% in 1992 to nearly 55% in 1998. Unknown in CEEC’s
transition countries, barter is only one aspect of the Russian economy's demonetisation process, along
with dollarisation, growing arrears, and the widespread use of veksels and offsets.  Barter is often
seen as the consequence of the lack of restructuring, but some authors argue that it is a mechanism
used to avoid shutting down potentially viable firms, in a context of market imperfections. The
implications differ depending on the analysis chosen: in the first case, an expansionary monetary
policy might not be appropriate, while the contrary is true if the demonetisation process jeopardizes
potentially good enterprises.
This paper aims to assess this phenomenon in the Russian economy. The paper's main contribution to
work in this field (reviewed and documented in section II) is to highlight two different rationales for
barter.  Before studying the latter more closely, section III uses official monthly data collected by the
central bank of Russia, the Goskomstat, and the Russian Economic Barometer (REB), to emphasize
the macro-economic features of barter in Russia, and, more specifically, the link between monetary
policy and bartering activity.  It appears that macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic indicators
are unable to explain the whole process.  In section IV, quarterly statistics for 1995 and 1996 taken
from the REB survey of roughly 200 firms make it possible to implement a more qualitative survey.
The conclusion is striking: barter is used by potentially viable firms as a way of avoiding closure,
while at the same time financing increasing inventories and soft goods in the case of indebted firms
who use barter transactions, bank credit and choose to accumulate arrears in order to avoid
restructuring.
II BACKGROUND
Two sets of explanations of barter can be drawn (see graph 1 below). The first one, which we call
strategic barter, focuses on the inability of money to perform its function (Poser, 1998). This inability
may be due to a process of demonetisation: in the prevailing context of high inflation in Russia, barter
could be rational. It can also be the consequence of the growing informal economy: the decision to
engage in barter is thus motivated mostly by managers' efforts to seek informal profit, and especially
by a desire to avoid taxes (Ickes and al. 1997, Hendlez and al. 1997).
The second set of explanations focuses on liquidity constraints: firms use barter transaction to sustain
operations in a cash constrained world (see for example Linz and Krueger (1998)). This cash4
constrained world is imposed by the lack of payments at the firm level, and/or growing monetary
restraint at the economy-wide level.
Graph 1: survey of barter explanations
2.1 Strategic Barter
i) avoiding taxation;
Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) provide a simple model which highlights the incentives
leading firms to choose between operating in the official and the unofficial sector. Firms will enter the
formal economy if the benefits exceed the costs. In the official sector, the government provides public
goods that increase the productivity of firms, but it imposes taxes and regulations on firms. The
smaller the potential network effects, the smaller the incentive for a particular firm to operate in the
formal sector. An important motive for operating in the unofficial sector is the desire to avoid official
taxes. As tax liabilities are due only once the firm receives payment for its deliveries, barter is a
useful means of avoiding taxes. For Gaddy and Ickes (1998) tax evasion is the first and most obvious
motive for barter in Russia.
However, this explanation of barter is not really convincing for at least two reasons. Firstly, the use of
barter relies on creation of exchange chains and is very costly (Linz and Krueger 1998; Hendley,
Ickes, Murrell and Ryterman, 1997). Barter requires a «double coincidence of wants» from the two
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transaction agents. This supposes a time consuming search as well as inventory costs. In this context,
it is not certain that the benefits of barter, in terms of tax avoidance, exceed the associated costs.
Secondly, payment in cash can be seen as another successful way of tax evasion, as western
experience proves. In these countries, cash transactions are the primary means used to avoid taxes. In
Russia, the task of collecting taxes is still performed by banks, which have to inform authorities about
all payment receipts and to debit the account of a tax debtor. In this context, firms have strong
incentives not to effect payments through the banking system. But, this does not apply to cash
payment.
The last explanation is based on more empirical grounds. A study carried out by the REB asked firms
to give their basic reasons for using barter. If the tax avoidance motive is relevant for 20% of the
companies, it is not the dominant factor (Aukutsionek, 1998). Commander and Mumssen (1998) show
that most firms believe that barter rather increases their tax bill, partly because the barter prices
almost always exceed cash prices.
ii) Demonetization: barter as a monetary substitute;
A second analysis focuses on payments systems failure, with the inability of money to perform its
functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value (see Poser, 1998, for a
detailed analysis). Enginer and Bernhardt (1991) consider a theoretical model in which barter
competes with money. They show that barter takes place if there is a double coincidence of wants and
the cash-in-advance constraint, limiting monetary exchange. In their model, there is a unique inflation
rate below which the only means of exchange is money, and over which money has no value. Hayashi
and Matsui (1994) found, in a similar analysis, that monetary exchange is costly due to the cash-in-
advance constraint, in the case of a positive inflation rate.
In Russia, barter was initially considered a natural response to the high inflation that prevailed in after
prices were liberalized. When inflation is high, the opportunity cost of holding money increases, and
barter is used as a monetary substitute. However, if we calculate a simple correlation rate between
barter and inflation rate variables, we find that this correlation is negative.
Barter
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Sources of data: Russian Economic Trend and Russian Economic Barometer.6
Barter increases when inflation decreases. This statistical correlation reflects most notably the fact
that barter has substantially increased in Russia as financial stabilization has proceeded. Hence barter
cannot be considered a substitute for the depreciating currency, and the negative correlation between
inflation and barter suggests rather an explanation in terms of liquidity constraints.
2.2 Liquidity constraint
i) Micro-economic explanation: barter expressing an unequal access to liquidity;
The lack of liquidity in good firms is bound to structural reasons. Linz and Krueger (1998) found that
barter is used unevenly across firms and is correlated to the particular industry in which the firm
operates. Barter should be especially used for purchases which are important compared to the firms’
liquidity. For example, intermediate or equipment goods represent large purchases and are more
common in barter transactions (Marin, Schnitzer 1995). For Linz and Krueger (1998), firms that have
access to cash, such as food industry firms, appear less likely to rely upon barter and pay above
average wages. Conversely, machinery industries appear more likely to rely on barter. The
explanation is that the latter are removed from the final customer and must deal on a wholesale level.
Non-access to retail customers reduces their ability to develop cash transactions. In the absence of
well-functioning capital market which could improve the firms’ liquidity position, these firms are
obliged to use barter transactions.
Aukutsionek (1998) reinforces this explanation of barter by showing that the sector using barter the
most produces intermediate goods (in this sector, the share of barter as an annual average has reached
55% in 1997), followed by the investment goods sector (42%) and finally by the consumer goods
(32%) and agricultural (31%) sectors. Table 1 below reports the level of barter in our database
depending on the branch in which the firm is operating:
Table 1: Barter by branch
Share of branches in total sample Share of barter in sales (%)
Consumer Goods 41.9 25.3
Foodstuffs 16.2 17
textile Goods 10.5 38
Paper, Wood 8.5 29
Others 6.7 21
Investment Goods 33.8 32.1
Machinery 28.7 33
Fuels 5.1 27
Intermediate Goods 24.3 42.3
Construction Material 13.7 44
Chemical (incl. Oil refining) 4.7 40
Energy, Electricity 3.1 35
Metallurgy 2.8 46
Source: quarterly REB survey, June and December 1995 and 1996, 819 enterprises. See Annex A at the end of
the paper.7
The regional breakdown (in Table 2) also suggests evidence of an unequal access to liquidity: the
level of barter is strongly differentiated depending on the region in which the firm is located:
Table 2: Barter by region
Codes Region Number of
observations
% in the Sample Barter (%)
Siberia 118 14.2 39.2
2, 32 East Siberia 43 5.2 35
3, 33, 34 West Siberia 75 9 41.7
Urals 96 11.6 43.2
4, 35 South Urals 66 8 41
5, 36 North Urals 30 3.6 48
Volga: 182 21.9 32.8
6, 42 Volga-Vyatka 45 5.4 33.7
7, 39 Volga 113 13.6 32.6
8, 40 Volga 24 2.9 32
West 85 10.3 34.8
9, 41 Central Black-Soil 62 7.5 34
10, 43 Central 23 2.8 37
11, 44 Central 42 5.1 27.2
12, 45, 46 Moscow region 47 5.7 14.8
13, 47 North 114 13.7 30.7
14, 48 St Petersburg
region
77 9.3 21.6
16, 38 North Caucasus 68 8.2 27.6
Total 829 100 32
Source: quarterly REB survey, June and December 1995 and 1996. See Annexes A and C at the end of the paper.
ii) Micro-economic explanation: lack of restructuring versus liquidity shortage;
The worsening of the firms financial situation and the implied increase in barter over time is either
linked to poor economic performance or to liquidity shortage, due to credit rationing : for Hendley
and al. (1997), barter is an attempt by firms to sustain socialist production patterns. It can be
interpreted as a bankruptcy-delaying tactic for firms and closely reflects the lack of restructuring. On
the contrary, for Linz and Krueger (1998) or Aukutsionek (1998) barter is a mechanism used to avoid
shutting down potentially viable firms.
In this case, barter is connected to liquidity shortage in a context of imperfect financial market
conditions and, more precisely, of credit market imperfections (Ellingsen 1998; Linz, Krueger 1998).
Three features may explain the existence of credit rationing, even for good firms. Firstly, some buyers
are liquidity constrained because they are unable to pledge future returns. Furthermore, in the
transition process, past performance is an inadequate indicator of future profitability (Bevan, Estrin,
Schaffer, 1999). Secondly, as in Western countries, buyers have private information about liquidity.
However, the informational asymmetries are stronger in transition economies, where problems of8
adverse selection and credit rationing are more likely to occur. In Russia, opaque balance sheets foster
the barter economy (OECD 1997). Finally, banks suffered from weak protection from creditors’
rights.
The dilemma - lack of restructuring versus liquidity shortage - can be assessed at first glance by
simply looking at barter, rate of capacity utilization, order books level, and profit variables. If barter is
used to sustain the former socialist production patterns, then one can expect barter to be negatively
correlated to profit. The reverse should be observed if barter is financing the lack of working capital
in a context of credit shortage. As reflected in the following tables, the reality is far from that simple,
barter is not clearly associated with an above average indicator of profitability, nor with an above
average utilization of capacity rate (or order books level), while it is clearly differentiated by region
(see Annex B) and/or sector and/or firms' size (as proxied by the number of employees: labor):
Table 3: Barter, rate of capacity utilization, order book level, and profit.
%B a r t e r  ( br) %
Indebted Not indebted Indebted Not indebted Total Labor
Consumer Goods 62.9 37.1 23.4 27.5 25.3 479
Foodstuffs 69.9 30.1 16 19 17 351
Textile Goods 67.4 32.6 38 38 38 569
Paper, Wood 60 40 27 32 29 685
Others 43.6 56.4 14 26 21 388
Investment Goods 70 30 32.7 28.8 32.1 910
Machinery 68.1 31.2 33 32 33 854
Fuels 81 19 31 11 27 1230
Intermediate Goods 67.7 32.3 43.6 38 42.3 1087
Construction Material 67.9 32.1 43 45 44 654
Chemical (incl. Oil refining) 73.7 26.3 49 16 40 1325
Energy, Electricity 52 48 35 35 35 1379
Metallurgy 73.9 26.1 47 44 46 2483
Total 66.5 33.5 31.5 30.5 31.7 873
Rate of capacity utilization (utc)% Order books level (ord) % Profit
Indebted Not indebted Total Indebted Not indebted Total
Consumer Goods 55.9 54.7 55.5 66.3 70.6 67.9 1.78
Foodstuffs 55 58 56 67 83 72 1.7
Textile Goods 51 46 50 59 62 60 2
Paper, Wood 59 54 57 72 63 68 1.8
Others 62 61 62 69 64 66 1.6
Investment Goods 56.8 52.9 55.6 69 60.1 66.3 1.9
Machinery 53 50 52 66 58 64 1.9
Fuels 78 69 77 86 72 83 2
Intermediate Goods 55.7 54.5 55.3 62.8 63.5 63.1 1.67
Construction Material 56 50 54 59 53 57 1.7
Chemical (incl. Oil refining) 44 55 47 56 72 60 2
Energy, Electricity 61 84 72 78 95 87 1.2
Metallurgy 68 43 61 76 66 73 1.5
Total 56.2 54 55.5 66.4 65.3 66.2 1.8
Source: Quarterly REB survey, June and December 1995 and 1996. See Annex C at the end of the paper.
Profit is set equal to one when the firm is profit-making, to «2», when the profit is zero, and «3», when the firm is
loss-making.  The average profit in the branch takes values between 1 and 3: the closer it is to «1» (or «3»), the
more profitable (the less profitable) the branch.  Averages are weighted averages.9
Several interpretations may be drawn:
As far as the opaque balance sheets mentioned above are concerned, the perception by firms of their
real situation and profitability is likely to be biased by the overall lack of restructuring in the Russian
economy and overall uncertainty. A higher order books level, higher utilization of capacity rate, and
higher profit may reflect for instance the maintenance of old ties and old production patterns.
Consequently, the link between barter and profit is weak.
Moreover, the increase in barter over time suggests that increasing returns are at work: certain firms
may be drawn to use barter regardless of their real and financial situation simply because the majority
of firms in the region or in the branch are operating this way, and it would be costly to do otherwise.
One important consequence of the implied externalities is that the correlation between barter and the
other variables, if any, might be not significant by not taking into account the regional, sector, or
whatever, component of barter. In section IV, fixed effects are used to cope with that problem.
Finally it is worth mentioning that barter appears positively correlated to firms' size. This result seems
to contradict the theoretical reasons highlighted in order to explain the success of barter in market
economies: that is the argument that barter eases the squeeze on cash flow that often plagues small
business (see Prendergast and Stole, 1996). Yet, one of the major problems opposing barter is the
challenge of finding a suitable trading partner. Barter, as an informal activity, requires great
investment in relational capital (Gaddy, Ickes, 1998). So, we can expect that the average size of an
enterprise governs the potential stock of relational capital. Aukutsionek (1998) showed that barter to a
large extent replaces already existing trade links between enterprises. The more extensively an
enterprise uses barter, the more connections it has maintained with old suppliers.
iii) Macro-economic explanation: tight monetary policy;
This explanation of barter is examined in the following section, where we look at whether tight
monetary policy can explain firms’ financial situations and the increase in barter over time. The idea
is that a rise in refinancing interest rates, or a decrease in money issuing, while bringing inflation
under control, may at the same time decrease firms’ sales and liquidity.
III BARTER AND MONETARY CONSTRAINTS
In this section we look at the relationships between barter and liquidity constraints at a
macroeconomic level. We use two methods: Granger-causality tests and cointegration analysis.10
3.1: Granger-causality tests between barter and a battery of macroeconomic variables
From the negative correlation between barter and inflation mentioned in the previous section, it is
tempting to attribute the growth of barter (or of arrears) to a shortage of liquidity linked to
stabilization. This point of view relies upon two underlying hypotheses. First, firms are faced with
shortage of liquidity and second, this shortage can be explained by macroeconomic policy.
We focused first on the link between barter and the financial situation of firms, as proxied by goodfin.
This variable is set equal to one when the firm perceives its financial situation as good. Averaged over
the REB sample each month, we find the share of enterprises perceiving themselves as being in a
good financial situation. The barter variable is the share of barter in firms’ sales. The correlation
between these two variables is negative; barter decreases when the firm's financial situation improves.
We also found a Granger causality relationship: a worsening of the financial situation explains the
increasing use of barter (see table 4).
Next, we have to test whether the macroeconomic situation and, more precisely, tight monetary policy
explain the evolution of firms’ financial situations and the underlying increase in barter over time. A
tightening of monetary policy reflected in a rising refinancing interest rate, or in the reduction of
money issuing, can bring inflation under control. At the same time, it depresses demand, which
decreases firms’ sales and liquidity
4. The test is done by computing partial correlation coefficients
between a battery of monthly variables and the estimated causality in the sense defined by Granger
(1969). These variables are: barter, the inflation rate, the real refinancing interest rate, and the
liquidity rate (the liquidity ratio M2/PIB). One Granger causality relationship emerges (see table 4,
columns 3 and 4); an increase in the real refinancing rate causes an increase in barter.
                                                          
4 Alfanderi and Schaffer (1996), who focused on payment arrears in the Russian enterprise sector, found a similar
negative relationship between the consumer price index (CPI) lagged one month and the ratio of overdue
commercial receivables in industry to mid 1995. They found a strong negative correlation; when inflation is high
(rising) in Russia, trade credit arrears are low (falling). For these authors, this close inverse relationship can be
explained by the fact that tightening liquidity conditions drive these two variables.11
Table 4: Correlation and Granger-causality test between barter and financial tightness
Correlation with barter
Granger-causality test
(Fisher statistic with 6 degrees of freedom)
Over the whole period
1992 (1) – 1998(1)
Beginning of transition
1992(1) – 1996(1)
Goodfin - 59% 2.32* 3.49*
Inflation rate - 82% 0.71 0.76
Real refinancing interest rate 41% 1.7 3.47*
GKO real yield 71% 0.66 0.82
Liquidity rate 49% 1.04 0.71
We used stationary variables for Granger-causality tests (variables I(1) are differentiated).
*, ** indicates significance at 95%, 99%
Sources of data: Russian Economic Trend and Russian Economic Barometer.
An increase in the real refinancing rate indeed causes an increase in barter: the decreasing inflation
rate over the period raised the real interest rate which became positive in January 1991. In a context of
cash-in-advance constraint and liquidity shortage, as the cost of obtaining credit increases, borrowers
try to overcome these constraints. They use liquidity from other sources and increase their use of
barter. High interest rates make it hard for firms to borrow.
We didn't find the same type of causality with real interest rate on GKO. These results might suggest
that firms rely on barter because they do not want to borrow in a context of liquidity shortage and not
because they prefer to invest their liquidity in GKO.
The decrease in money supply was not found to cause the increase in barter: this suggests that the
shortage of money in the economy (the demonetisation process) does not, in itself, cause the barter
phenomenon. We tried to find some other explanations; in terms of the distressed economic situation
(causality tests between barter, evolution of production, and evolution of capacity utilization rate in
industry are not conclusive) and of share of indebted firms. Results are disappointing (and are not
reported here). At the macroeconomic level, barter does not seem strongly correlated with real
indicators, but only partially with access to external financing. This suggest that a more careful
analysis, at the micro level (see section IV), is needed to understand the exact nature of liquidity
constraints.
3.2: Cointegration analysis
We now try to estimate long-run relationships between the different variables highlighted by causality
tests. The different variables presented above being non-stationary, we have to rely upon a
cointegration analysis. When two series are cointegrated, we can distinguish between a long run
relationship between these two series, that is to say the manner in which the two variables drift12
upward together and the short-run dynamics, that is to say the relationship between deviations from
their long run trend. The Johansen maximum likelihood procedure consists in estimating an error-
correction representation of a vector-autoregressive model of order k. We first estimated the rank of
the matrix of the long-run responses using the maximum likelihood method developed by Johansen
(1995) (cf. Table 5).
Table 5: Johansen maximum likelihood procedure (1993-7; 1998-11)
H0: rank=p Maximum
eigenvalue statistics
95% critical value Trace statistics 95% critical value
p=0 37.63** 21 46.51** 29.7
p<=1 8.32 14.1 8.87 14.4
p<=2 0.55 3.8 0.55 3.8
Standardized eigenvectors
Barter Goodfin Interest rate
1 0.5224 -0.1422
0.3429 1 1.363
-0.5096 0.07341 1
The number of lags (5) was chosen based on the Hannan-Quinn information criterion.
*, ** indicates significance at 95%, 99%.
Table 5 shows that there is only one cointegrating vector. This means that there is only one
combination of the variables that produces stationary residuals. The long-run equation for barter is the
following:
Barter = – 0.52 Goodfin + 0.14 Interest rate
Again we find that barter increases together with interest rates, but decreases as the financial situation
of firms improves. In the short-run there will be deviations from the long run relations found above.
The short-run barter determination can be explained by a dynamic error correction model, where
changes in barter depend on prior deviations from the long-run equilibrium and on prior changes in all
variables.
Table 6: Error correction Engle-Granger equation
5
∆ Barter = 0.13 -  0.19 ∆ Goodfint -  0.15 ∆ Goodfint-1 + 0.11 ∆ txRFt -  0.68 ECMt-1
(0.5) (- 3.7) (-2.7) (2.7) (- 4.7)
R
2 = 0.40      DW = 2.13     AR (5, 55) = 1.69     ARCH(5, 50) = 0.30       Normality χ
2 = 2.3
txRF is the refinancing interest rate and ECMt-1 represents the error correction term.
                                                          
5 All variables, except the error correction term, are differentiated and thus are I(0).13
Also in the short run, barter is correlated with indicators of financial tightness: barter increases when
current real interest rates increase and decreases as the firm's financial situation improves (see Graph
2). No other variable (as liquidity rate, production, capacity utilization rate or inflation rate) appears
significant, as confirmed by the Lagrange-multiplier tests for omitted variables
6.
Graph 2. Macroeconomic explanations of barter
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with irRF, the real interest rate of refinancing ; crBadfin, the three months moving average increasing
rate of firms in bad financial situation ; and crBarter the three months moving average increasing rate
of barter.
To summarize, firms seem to use barter transactions in order to sustain production in a cash-
constrained economy
7. Real interest rates have been found to cause fluctuations in barter over time,
and the relationships between barter on one hand, and financial situation and interest rates
fluctuations on the other hand, prove to be quite strong for the whole period. However, the liquidity
ratio, although correlated with barter, does not exhibit any causality relationships with it. Thus, our
                                                          
6 This allows tests for the significance of complete lag functions of excluded variables. Results are not conclusive
and therefore are not presented here.14
conclusion is that monetary policy tightness at the macro-economic level only partially explains the
increasing use of barter, but we have yet to call upon explanations of the lack of liquidity at the firm
level.
IV MICRO-EVIDENCE CONCERNING BARTER
As shown in the previous section, barter is positively linked to the firm's financial situation. In order
to better understand the link between these two factors, we distinguish enterprises which have access
to credit from those which do not
8. We show that two different types of behavior can generate barter:
for enterprises which are not provided with credit by banks, it acts as a substitute for short-term
credit; for indebted enterprises, barter in the same way as external finance, is a way of avoiding costly
restructuring. This approach is slightly different to that followed by Ickes and Gaddy (1998)
9, who
emphasize that barter results from the supply of soft credit by the State to the State sector, and
consequently barter should be lower in private firms. Here we look more closely at the micro-
economic rationale for barter, by implicitly assuming that soft budget constraints hold only for certain
enterprises, which benefit from bank credit, while other firms are obliged to adapt to market
discipline.
4.1 Data and Methodology
The panel data base we use has been extracted from the REB (see Annex A). The data were collected
in June 1995, December 1995, June 1996, and December 1996. There are a total of 736 observations
on enterprises in the unbalanced dataset. The variable ncr, equal to 1 when the firm declares that it is
not indebted and not going to be, divides the sample into two: those that are not financed through the
banking system (484 enterprises), and those that are the main recipients of the banking credit (252,
but 263 if we are considering a subset of explanatory variables). As suggested above, the Russian
banking system is characterized by severe adverse selection problems. We argue that market
discipline is more likely to be observed by non-indebted enterprises: in this sense, the ncr variable is
well suited for distinguishing different types of firms.
By contrast, the profit variable, although available in the REB (see Annex A), does not turn out to be
a good proxy for firms performance, as emphasized in most papers dealing with the transition process
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 This result confirms the REB survey: barter is primarily, for 61% of enterprises in 1998, a means of maintain
production in a context of shortage of working capital. The second motive, for 41% of firms, is the desire to
speed up sales of output (Aukutsionek, 1998).
8 This distinction can also be motivated by the findings in Brana, Maurel and Sgard (1999), who showed that
credit is mainly allocated towards loss-making firms, while profitable enterprises on the contrary are shut out of
the banking system.
9 For those authors, barter allows enterprises in Russia, often monopoly suppliers, to pay taxes in «soft goods».15
in the former Soviet Union
10. We nevertheless tried to estimate barter equations in Table 7 for profit
makers and loss makers, using the profit  variable, but the results, not reported here, were not
satisfactory.
We could also test the assumption that ownership is a key variable in explaining barter. This variable
was unfortunately not available in the REB; although Estrin and Rosevear (1999) do not find strong
links with firm performance, they establish that barter in Ukraine is associated with lower
profitability, and is less common in privatised firms
11. However, the rational behind this result is not
clear: in particular the assumption that outsider owned firms will perform better in terms of barter
than all other ownership types is not supported.
To summarize, both the macro-economic framework in the previous section and the emphasis we
place on bank credit towards already indebted enterprises (versus the role of the cash liquidity
constraint for non indebted firms) brings out a sharp distinction between indebted and non indebted
enterprises. This distinction is not simply a proxy for that between profitable and non-profitable firms.
Our model (see equations 1, 1’, 2, 2’) of barter simply claims that certain firms, whatever privatised or
not and profitable or not, are more subject to market discipline than are others. We suspect that this
might be related to access to bank credit, whose allocation is distorted in the Russian context towards
already heavily indebted enterprises or/and loss makers. If this model describes the Russian economy
correctly, then one important implication is that enterprises excluded from the banking system are
victims of the diffusion of barter (in the sense that they would prefer to use money), while other firms,
which try to escape from the restructuring effort, are the cause of this diffusion of barter.
The panel structure of the REB allows us to take into account the strong regional and sector
components of barter (as suggested in the huge discrepancies in Tables 1 and 2), and all other kinds of
fixed effects, including the structure of property. The stress is thus put not on the average level of
barter by sector, region, ownership, etc., but on the reasons for changes in its level.
Fixed effects are unable to capture all the heterogeneity in the sample. For example, for indebted
firms, increased barter is correlated with inventories: it is a way of avoiding costly restructuring. For
non-indebted enterprises, barter is used as a substitute for short term credit. We thus expect the
determinants of barter to be different between the two sub-samples. Then we estimated two forms:
form 1 contains the fin variable, while form 2 does not.
                                                          
10 Measurement problem aside, in the transition period profits may yield a distorted picture if active restructuring
leads to the writing off of bad debts or accumulated losses. What concerns the REB, this warning has to be
moderated: Brana, Maurel and Sgard (1999) showed that firms with the worst indicator of profit have poor
performances and bad financial positions. For profitable enterprises, on the contrary, profitability, order book
level and capacity utilization rate are relatively high.
11 This result is compatible with the model developed by Ickes and Gaddy (1998), as privatised firms are less
likely to receive soft credit from the State, therefore less likely to engage in bartering activity.16
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where:
•   br is the current share of barter in sales (in percent), for each firm at each time (t is successively
set equal to Q1= June 1995, Q2 = December 1995, Q3 = June 1996, Q4 = December 1996), and
∑ =
t
i it i T br br / ;
•   inv is inventory stocks, where the usual monthly level is set equal to 100, and  ∑ =
t
i it i T inv inv / .
We assume that this variable is a proxy for the lack of restructuring, inasmuch as an increase in
inventories means that the market does not clear supply and demand;
•   lma is set equal to 1 if the perceived main impediment to production is insufficient demand, and
∑ =
t
i it i T lma lma / . This is a proxy for firm sensitivity to demand conditions on the goods
market;
•   fin takes values 1 (good financial position), 2 (normal financial position), and 3 (bad financial
position), and  ∑ =
t
i it i T fin fin /;
•   labor is the number of employees, and  ∑ =
t
i it i T labor labor / . As mentioned in Aukutsionek
(1998), the more extensively an enterprise uses barter, the more connections it has maintained
with old suppliers, while the network of old suppliers depends upon the size of the enterprise;
•   it i u + ν  is the residual,  i ν  being the unit specific residual, and  it u  the usual residual assumed to
be iid;
•   Q1, Q2, Q3 are dummy variables equal to one when the observation corresponds to the first
semester (June 1995), to the second semester (December 1995), to the third (June 1996), and to
the fourth (December 1996). They are introduced in the equation to take into account the increase
in barter over time.17
Assumption 1: Barter allows indebted enterprises, responsible for the adverse-selection problem, to
unload excess inventory. There should therefore be a positive correlation between barter and inv.
These firms can continue to produce «soft goods», for which there is no effective demand. We thus
expect the correlation between lma and barter to be positive (or not significant): when the lack of
demand starts being identified as the main impediment to production, barter either increases or
remains stable.
Assumption 2: For enterprises excluded from the banking system, barter is linked to the tightness of
external finance.  It is expected to decrease (increase), when the main impediment to production
ceases to be the lack of demand (becomes the lack of demand). Here barter is seen as a substitute for
financial resources, whose shortage acts as an impediment to the supplying of market demand. Under
this assumption, the correlation between lma and barter is expected to be negative.
Assumption 3: The coefficient on fin reflects the extent to which a worsening of the financial situation
increases barter. If assumptions 1 and 2 are correct, then a worsening financial situation is expected to
increase barter, which indeed serves as a substitute for external finance. For non-indebted firms,
barter allows the working capital required for production to be financed. For indebted firms, it
finances the production of soft goods.
4.2 Results
Our findings are reported in Table 7 (columns I, II, III, IV). Each column reports the results of random
effects and fixed effects regressions for equations of form 1 (columns I, Ia, Ib, IIIa, IIIb), including the
fin variable, and 2 (columns II, IIa, IIb, IVa, IVb), excluding it. The equations are always significant at
the usual level (coefficients in italics are not significant). Hausman specification tests prefer the
equations without fin. Nevertheless, the coefficients are very similar across the different estimations,
which means that the model specification is fairly robust.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are confirmed (see columns Ia to IVa, and Ib to IVb ): in the group of indebted
12
firms (and/or going to be indebted), an increase in barter is associated with a positive variation in
inventories, but it is insensitive to a jump in lma from 0 to 1, while the contrary is true for non-
indebted enterprises. The empirical analysis thus supports the view that barter allows the former to
unload excess inventory (Prendergast, Stole 1996) and to produce «soft goods», for which there is no
effective demand. It offers some flexibility to managers and can be seen as the symptom of
insufficient restructuring. Non-indebted firms, on the other hand, have hard budget constraints and
suffer from a shortage of working capital. This cash constraint is less binding when the main
impediment to production is the lack of demand: in this case the enterprise adjusts by decreasing its
                                                          
12 In Brana, Maurel and Sgard (1999) again, these enterprises have been shown to be in serious financial
difficulties: being chronic loss-makers, they are unable to pay in cash.18
Table 7: Estimation of Equations 1’ and 2’.
Total Sample
column I II
Barter Random effects Fixed Effects Random effects Fixed Effects
inv 0,036 0,037 0,040 0,038
lma -1,600 -0,922 -1,850 -0,962
fin 3,517 0,527
labor 0,00203 0,00152 0,00211 0,00155
Q1 -18,368 -18,034 -18,729 -18,093
Q2 -13,331 -13,284 -13,442 -13,289
Q3 -3,206 -2,986 -3,482 -3,029
intercept 26,728 36,215
R
2 0,1488 0,1294
number of observations 736
number of groups 403
Hausman Specification Test
Chi( ) Chi(7) = 14,56 Chi(6) = 2,07
Prob>Chi2 0,042 0,9128
Indebted Firms
ncr = 0
column Ia IIa IIIa IVa
Barter Random
effects
Fixed Effects Random
effects
Fixed Effects Random
effects
Fixed Effects Random
effects
Fixed Effects
inv 0,052 0,077 0,059 0,079 0,053 0,077 0,060 0,079
lma 0,991 0,823 0,441 0,648
fin 4,674 1,536 4,567 1,454
labor 0,00215 0,00050 0,00222 0,00053 0,00211 0,00047 0,00220 0,00051
Q1 -17,079 -17,330 -17,613 -17,528 -17,221 -17,448 -17,672 -17,614
Q2 -12,308 -12,398 -12,617 -12,452 -12,375 -12,473 -12,644 -12,509
Q3 -2,320 -2,709 -2,587 -2,795 -2,369 -2,736 -2,606 -2,813
intercept 19,368 32,166 20,179 32,400
R
2 0,1544 0,1345 0,1538 0,1345
number of observations 484
number of groups 310
Hausman Specification Test
Chi( ) Chi(7) = 5,34 Chi(6) = 1,83 Chi(6) = 5,34 Chi(5) = 1,82
Prob>Chi2 0,618 0,9346 0,5011 0,8736
Non Indebted Firms (and not going to be);
ncr = 1
column Ib IIb IIIb IVb
Barter Random
effects
Fixed Effects Random
effects
Fixed Effects Random
effects
Fixed Effects Random
effects
Fixed Effects
inv 0,013 -0,010 0,015 -0,009
lma -8,022 -6,575 -7,364 -6,174 -6,889 -6,498 -6,308 -6,112
fin 6,043 1,533 4,629 1,454
labor 0,00413 0,01105 0,00434 0,01067 0,00457 0,00395 0,00470 0,00372
Q1 -22,790 -22,247 -23,094 -22,186 -21,161 -20,502 -21,387 -20,472
Q2 -15,259 -15,706 -15,152 -15,596 -14,691 -14,646 -14,420 -14,472
Q3 -5,012 -5,906 -5,938 -6,068 -4,669 -5,544 -5,401 -5,731
intercept 25,926 41,863 28,638 41,011
R
2 0,1770 0,1453 0,1597 0,1339
number of observations 252 263
number of groups 175 181
Hausman Specification Test
Chi( ) Chi(7) = 3,56 Chi(6) = 1,70 Chi(6) = 3,04 Chi(5) = 0,84
Prob>Chi2 0,8286 0,945 0,8043 0,974119
use of barter. This result has to be put into light with that in Marin and Schnitzer (1999)
13, for whom
the inversely U-shaped relationship between barter and output, that is, the positive effect of barter on
output growth for low barter firms and the negative effect for high barter firms, indicates that high
growth firms « showed a favorable growth performance because they used their credit constraint and
barter activity effectively to avoid an input and financial shortage ». Low growth firms are faced with
a « too large credit enforcement costs which makes it worthwhile for the input supplier to participate
in the deal », hence barter cannot help to maintain production by getting trade credit from other firms.
In our approach, although the emphasis is not put on the relative output growth performance, we
would explain the negative correlation between output and barter for indebted firms by the lack of
market discipline and the persistence of soft budget constraint, which explain the increase in credit
enforcement costs.
In light of these results, one can interpret the coefficient of fin (columns Ia, Ib, IIIa, IIIb) in two
different ways, depending on which objective is pursued when a particular firm uses barter as a
substitute for external finance. If it is to maintain an artificial level of production (assumption 1), then
barter reflects liquidity shortage due to the lack of restructuring; if it is to finance production in the
context of a hard budget constraint (assumption 2), then barter merely reflects a cash liquidity
constraint.
IV. CONCLUSION
The process of transition can be viewed as the transition from a centrally planned economy to a
monetary economy, where money imposes hard budget constraints on firms (Poser, 1998). As the
transformation from plan to market proceeds, and profitability becomes the main aim of enterprises,
barter should decline. In this context, the growing process of barter in Russia since 1992 can be seen
as the sign of a delaying process of transition and restructuring.
We showed, however, that barter is a complex phenomenon, which has different roots from firm to
firm. For bad enterprises, barter can be seen as a bankruptcy delaying tactic, while in profitable
enterprises it is used as an additional liquidity, in a context of credit rationing by banks. In both cases,
the barter phenomenon reveals the importance of bankruptcy procedures. At the micro-economic
level, barter lowers the ability of money to harden firms' budgets. It consolidates existing inter-firm
relationships, reduces market competition, and tends to create artificial demand. Moreover, relative
price changes become less meaningful. Consequently, the pace of economic transition is slowed
down, and economic and financial valuation of firms becomes groundless. For good firms, lack of
                                                          
13 For these authors, barter provides a mechanism to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement is20
liquidity in a context of low retained earnings and low cash flows makes it impossible for them to
invest and restructure effectively. In the presence of capital market imperfections, efficient firms may
be forced to exit due to lack of funds
14. At a macro-economic level, the barterisation process is an
obvious impediment to effective macro-economic policy. It is a means of tax evasion (even if tax
evasion is more a consequence than a motive of barter) and puts constraints on fiscal policy. At the
same time, barter undermines monetary control and thus the stabilization policies. The implication of
this paper is that the priority must be given to restructuring at the micro level. Notably, the
implementation of efficient bankruptcy procedures appears a prerequisite for coping with barter and
with the de-intermediation process. Thus, eventually monetary and fiscal policy could play their role.
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ANNEX A
Russian Economic Barometer (REB) survey
The REB is a survey which has been conducted since 1992, on a monthly and quarterly basis. It is sent to
between 170 to 210 enterprises considered representative in terms of geographic as well as sector localization.
An important bias is the predominance of privatized firms, as opposed to new private firms. In the 1996 sample,
18% were State-owned, 26% had a mixed property structure, and 56% were privatized former State-owned-
enterprises.
The econometric part of this paper focuses on the panel dimension of the database, while aggregated indicators,
like monthly barter averaged over the whole sample or the percentage of firms which are in a good financial
situation for a given month, are used for the macroeconomic analysis. The variables we used are either expressed
in per cent of a monthly usual current level (br, inv, ord, utc), or are dummy variables:
br is the current share of barter in sales (in percent), for each individual at each time (t varies from t= first quarter
of 1995 to t= last quarter of 1996).
inv is the stock of inventories, where the usual monthly level is set equal to 100.
ord is the order books’ level, where the usual monthly level is set equal to 100.
utc: is the rate of capacity utilization, where the usual monthly level is set equal to 100.
ncr is set equal to 1 when the firm is not indebted and not going to be.
lma is set equal to «1» when the firm identifies insufficient demand as the main impediment to production.
lmb is set equal to «1» when the firm identifies a shortage of raw materials as the main impediment to production.
lmc is set equal to «1» when the firm identifies a shortage of financial resources as the main impediment to
production.
fin takes values 1 (good financial position), 2 (normal financial position), and 3 (bad financial position). goodfin
is set equal to 1 when the answer to fin is 1, and 0 elsewhere, in per cent it represents the share of enterprises in a
good financial situation.
By averaging over the whole sample, or sub-samples, one gets the percentage of firms which identify insufficient
demand (respectively the shortage of raw materials, the shortage of financial resources) as the main impediment
to production, as well as the percentage of firms which are in a good, bad, or normal financial situation.
REGIONS CODES
(Code) Region Components
(2, 32) East Siberia Krasnoyarsk Territory
Irkutsk region
Chita Region
Republic of Buryatia
Republic of Tyva
(3, 33, 34) West Siberia Altai Territory
Kemerovo Region
Novosibirsk Region
Omsk Region
Tomsk Region
Tyumen Region
(4, 35) Urals Kurgan region
Orenburg region
Chelyabinsk Region
Republic of Bashkortostan
(5, 36) Urals Perm region
Sverdlovsk Region
Udmurt Republic23
(6, 42) Volga-Vyatka Kirov Region
Republic of Mari El
Republic of Mordovia
Republic of Chuvashia
(7, 39) Volga  Samara region
Penza region
Ulyanovsk Region
Republic of Tatarstan
(8, 40) Volga Astrakhan Region
Volgograd
Saratov
Republic of Kalmykia
(9, 41) Central Black-Soil Belgorod Region
Voronezh Region
Kursk region
Lipetsk Region
Tambov region
(10, 43) Central Vladimir region
Ivanovo Region
Tver Region
Kostroma Region
Yaroslav Region
(11, 44) Central Bryansk Region
Kaluga region
Orel region
Ryazan Region
Smolensk Region
Tula region
(12, 45, 46) Central Moscow
Moscow Region
(13, 47) North Arkhangelsk Region
Vologda Region
Republic of Karelia
(14, 48) North-West St Petersburg
Leningrad region
Novgorod Region
Pskov Region
(16, 38) North Caucasus Krasnodar Territory
Stavropol Territory
Rostov Region
Republic of Daghestan
Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria
Republic of Northern Ossetia
Republic of Adigei
Karachai-Cherkess Republic
The following tables in Annex B, C, and D, present the aggregate statistics from the quarterly surveys
of June 1995 and 1996, December 1995 and December 1996.24
ANNEX B
Breakdown of barter, inventories, order books level, and rate of capacity of utilisation by Region
Region Number of observations share of barter (br) in sales % Inventories (inv) %
(usual monthly level =100)
order books level (ord) %
(usual monthly level =100)
rate of capacity utilisation (utc)
(%, usual monthly level =100)
Code Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
0 11 10 1 17 13 55 98 97 110 53 55 35 38 39 25
2 4 3 2 71 6 3 5 3 83 2 8 7 9 47 7 6 3 6 85 6 5 4 5 15 9
3 6 6 4 62 0 4 1 4 14 1 7 2 7 36 9 7 1 7 17 2 6 6 6 86 0
4 56 35 21 41 40 42 98 94 105 77 77 78 60 60 60
5 30 22 8 48 50 43 93 93 94 63 59 72 48 46 54
6 3 1 1 91 2 2 9 3 02 9 8 1 8 18 1 5 7 5 65 9 5 2 5 05 4
7 9 9 6 83 1 3 0 2 83 3 9 7 9 99 3 5 7 5 95 2 4 9 5 14 5
8 24 19 5 32 33 27 70 64 99 60 57 72 48 44 63
9 6 2 4 51 7 3 4 3 43 5 8 2 8 57 6 6 7 6 96 3 5 5 5 94 4
10 41 29 12 27 23 35 85 108 35 66 64 72 56 53 64
11 23 16 7 37 36 40 62 80 21 68 67 72 54 54 55
12 42 18 24 14 14 13 90 67 106 60 70 51 64 69 60
13 100 68 32 29 27 32 98 97 99 71 74 67 62 63 60
14 61 44 17 22 24 18 99 118 48 71 70 71 55 58 48
16 48 32 16 27 27 27 83 84 82 67 65 71 58 59 57
33 8 4 4 45 58 33 126 121 131 62 74 50 53 65 40
34 1 1 65 65 35 35 65 65 15 15
37 20 12 8 29 39 15 98 98 98 59 49 75 49 46 53
39 14 11 3 51 56 34 111 111 112 68 62 85 47 49 42
42 14 6 8 44 45 44 115 127 107 85 78 91 53 53 53
43 1 1 35 35 215 215 65 65 35 35
45 5 1 4 22 3 28 68 65 70 77 65 80 65 65 65
47 14 11 3 43 37 65 61 66 45 63 68 35 46 49 38
48 16 10 6 20 25 12 102 115 82 59 61 55 56 61 47
Total Sample: survey of June 1995 and 1996, December 1995 and 1996 ;
a: Total sample for ncr=0 (indebted and / or going to be indebted) ;
b: Total sample for ncr=1 (non-indebted and not going to be).25
ANNEX B (followed)
Percentage of firms which identify demand, shortage of financial resources, availability of inputs, as the main impediment to production, by Region
Region Number of observations Limit to production : demand (lma) Limit to production : inputs (lmb) Limit to production : financial (lmc)
Code Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-indebted
firms 
b
0 11 10 1 0,45 0,50 0,00 0,09 0,10 0,00 0,82 0,80 1,00
2 43 27 16 0,40 0,52 0,19 0,28 0,22 0,38 0,70 0,67 0,75
3 66 46 20 0,38 0,39 0,35 0,26 0,28 0,20 0,85 0,83 0,90
4 56 35 21 0,38 0,43 0,29 0,21 0,17 0,29 0,79 0,77 0,81
5 30 22 8 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,17 0,14 0,25 0,80 0,86 0,63
6 31 19 12 0,65 0,74 0,50 0,23 0,26 0,17 0,71 0,63 0,83
7 99 68 31 0,67 0,65 0,71 0,22 0,28 0,10 0,57 0,54 0,61
8 24 19 5 0,46 0,47 0,40 0,25 0,21 0,40 0,79 0,84 0,60
9 62 45 17 0,48 0,47 0,53 0,23 0,16 0,41 0,61 0,62 0,59
10 41 29 12 0,66 0,72 0,50 0,15 0,10 0,25 0,61 0,59 0,67
11 23 16 7 0,35 0,38 0,29 0,13 0,13 0,14 0,57 0,44 0,86
12 42 18 24 0,40 0,39 0,42 0,07 0,06 0,08 0,57 0,67 0,50
13 100 68 32 0,59 0,62 0,53 0,24 0,19 0,34 0,63 0,63 0,63
14 61 44 17 0,62 0,68 0,47 0,13 0,09 0,24 0,64 0,68 0,53
16 48 32 16 0,75 0,72 0,81 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,52 0,47 0,63
33 8 4 4 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,13 0,00 0,25 0,63 0,75 0,50
34 1 1 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
37 20 12 8 0,70 0,75 0,63 0,20 0,00 0,50 0,55 0,58 0,50
39 14 11 3 0,57 0,64 0,33 0,21 0,18 0,33 0,71 0,82 0,33
42 14 6 8 0,57 0,33 0,75 0,21 0,17 0,25 0,57 0,83 0,38
43 1 1 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
45 5 1 4 0,60 0,00 0,75 0,40 1,00 0,25 0,60 1,00 0,50
47 14 11 3 0,64 0,55 1,00 0,14 0,09 0,33 0,86 0,82 1,00
48 16 10 6 0,31 0,30 0,33 0,13 0,20 0,00 0,88 0,90 0,83
Total Sample: survey of June 1995 and 1996, December 1995 and 1996 ;
a: Total sample for ncr=0 (indebted and / or going to be indebted) ;
b: Total sample for ncr=1 (non-indebted and not going to be).26
ANNEX C: Breakdown of barter, inventories, order books level, and rate of capacity of utilisation by branch
Branches
Number of observations share of barter (br) in sales
%
Inventories (inv) %
(usual monthly level =100)
order books level (ord) %
(usual monthly level =100)
rate of capacity utilisation
(utc) %
(usual monthly level =100)
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Foodstuffs 133 93 40 17 16 19 68 70 66 72 67 83 56 55 58
Machinery 235 160 75 33 33 32 100 98 102 64 66 58 52 53 50
Fuels 42 34 8 27 31 11 83 87 71 83 86 72 77 78 69
Others 55 24 31 21 14 26 73 63 80 66 69 64 62 62 61
Construction Material 112 76 36 44 43 45 107 109 102 57 59 53 54 56 50
Consumer Goods 86 58 28 38 38 38 96 106 76 60 59 62 50 51 46
Chemical (incl. Oil
refining)
38 28 10 40 49 16 90 98 69 60 56 72 47 44 55
Paper, Wood 70 42 28 29 27 32 92 101 79 68 72 63 57 59 54
Energy, Electricity 25 13 12 35 35 35 26 57 18 87 78 95 72 61 84
Metallurgy 23 17 6 46 47 44 88 83 100 73 76 66 61 68 43
% of firms which identify demand, shortage of financial resources, availability of inputs, as the main impediment to production, by branch
Branches Limit to production : demand (lma) Limit to production : inputs (lmb) Limit to production : financial
(lmc)
Labor
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Total
sample
Indebted
firms 
a
Non-
indebted
firms 
b
Foodstuffs 0,70 0,74 0,60 0,30 0,29 0,33 0,46 0,48 0,40 404 432 339
Machinery 0,50 0,51 0,48 0,16 0,16 0,17 0,71 0,73 0,68 858 1071 381
Fuels 0,29 0,24 0,50 0,14 0,18 0,00 0,71 0,71 0,75 2140 2262 1649
Others 0,56 0,67 0,48 0,24 0,13 0,32 0,69 0,71 0,68 371 439 317
Construction Material 0,80 0,83 0,75 0,14 0,11 0,22 0,67 0,64 0,72 576 591 547
Consumer Goods 0,53 0,48 0,64 0,27 0,26 0,29 0,71 0,71 0,71 672 684 647
Chemical (incl. Oil refining) 0,53 0,57 0,40 0,21 0,18 0,30 0,68 0,71 0,60 1457 1616 1014
Paper, Wood 0,27 0,29 0,25 0,19 0,14 0,25 0,70 0,74 0,64 641 829 348
Energy, Electricity 0,36 0,62 0,08 0,20 0,23 0,17 0,76 0,62 0,92 1358 1657 1005
Metallurgy 0,35 0,41 0,17 0,22 0,12 0,50 0,78 0,82 0,67 2167 2155 2204
Total Sample: survey of June 1995 and 1996, December 1995 and 1996 ; a: Total sample for ncr=0 (indebted and / or going to be indebted) ;  b: Total sample for ncr=1 (not
indebted and not going to be).